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Abstract – The survey identified positive effects of work on information security risk management. Regarding the survey results of 
information system incidents, a significant reduction was recorded in the number of system downtime incidents. The scope of implementation 
of the risk assessment methodology is the whole ICT system, and therefore the implementation covers all parts of information assets. 
Positive effects are obtained by reducing the risk by known mitigation methods. Technical details of the implemented control measures 
were not considered in this paper. In accordance with the standards used in methodology development, significant and increasing levels of 
user awareness of ICT systems have been considered. The effects of all implemented measures have resulted in a significant increase in the 
availability of parts of ICT systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Risk management is a process that involves identifi-
cation, assessment, and prioritization of risks. A process 
or a method is a collection of related, structured activi-
ties or tasks that produce a specific service or a prod-
uct. In case of risk management, the term process is 
related to management, and thus it implies all business 
and organizational activities in the act of coordinating 
the efforts of people or technology to accomplish the 
desired goals and objectives using available resources 
efficiently and effectively. This article discusses the pro-
cesses associated with information or similar systems.
Once risks have been identified, they must then be 
assessed as to their potential severity of impact (nega-
tive impact, such as damage or loss) and to the prob-
ability of occurrence. These quantities can be either 
simple to measure, in the case of the value of a lost 
building, or impossible to know for sure, in the case of 
the probability of the occurrence of an unlikely event.
With proper information system risk management 
it is possible to reduce the frequency and intensity of 
risk-related incidents in the system [1]. The incidents 
include adverse events that have already happened in 
the operational part of the information system and the 
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information assets. It is easier to notice system weak-
nesses with risk management, but also to predict a pos-
sible adverse harmful event by using Bayes algorithm 
[2] and the calculation of posterior probabilities. The 
posterior probability indicates the likelihood of possi-
ble future events and it is calculated based on the esti-
mated probabilities used in the risk assessment. [3], [4].
Section 2 describes the information system risk man-
agement methodology. This section shows information 
asset categories and its description of performance rat-
ing. Section 3 explains the environment used to con-
duct an experiment. Section 4 compares the frequency 
and intensity of security incidents and presents results. 
The next section gives a brief insight into future re-
search. The conclusion is given at the end of the paper.
2. INFORMATION SYSTEM RISK 
MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY
The methodology underlying the results of research 
presented in this paper includes resources classified 
into information assets. Information assets include sev-
en categories of resources (as shown in Table 1):
Table 1. Categories of information assets
Category number Information asset
1 Environment and infrastructure
2 Personnel
3 Hardware
4 Applications and their databases
5 Communications
6 Documents and data
7 Other
Resource categories are introduced to better facili-
tate a visibility risk assessment procedure. Categoriza-
tion is not necessary to achieve results, but in the later 
analysis it provides a detailed statistical analysis. Each 
identified resource needs to be evaluated. Resource in-
formation assets are evaluated by assessing the impact 
according to the violation of information asset proper-
ties (Table 2). Information asset properties refer to con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability. Properties are se-
lected such that performance evaluation is applicable 
to all resource categories.
After having evaluated the impact, a risk assessment 
is conducted for information asset resources for the 
property where the effects of loss of properties are 
above the acceptable level. For each information asset 
resource it is necessary to select possible combinations 
of threats and vulnerabilities that together form infor-
mation system risks [5].
Risk is a function of the probability that a threat will 
exploit an existing vulnerability, and cause loss of an in-
formation asset property. A threat and vulnerability eval-
uation presents the estimated probability of realization 
as a function of the actual technical characteristics of the 
environment and implemented security measures.
The information system risk management process is 
a continuous repetition of identification, assessment 
and risk prioritization (Fig. 1) [1].
Following specific priorities for particular risks, the 
measures for diminishing risks to the level of accept-
ability or complete removal are determined. Measures 
to reduce risks are divided according to the implemen-
tation of security measures, transfer of risks to a third 
party, avoidance, and risk acceptance [8, 9]. By select-
ing some of the options for diminishing risks, the vul-
nerability grade is reduced, i.e. the probability that the 
recorded threat will exploit the vulnerability [6]. Threat 
assessment reduction is possible by transferring risks 
to a third party, or by avoiding risks, but only in spe-
cial cases. If the risk cannot be reduced by the methods 
mentioned, risk acceptance is selected as a method for 
emphasizing the existing weaknesses [10]. Accepted 
risks are continuously monitored and observed, and 
they are involved in the process of threat and vulner-
ability re-estimation.
Table 2. Description of information asset 
performance rating
Rating Description
No value or 
negligible
Assessed aspect (confidentiality, integ-
rity, availability, etc.) is not relevant or 
does not exist; loss of CIAO is negligi-
ble; the resource can be easily replaced
Low value
Resources in which loss of confidenti-
ality, integrity or availability indicates 
no significant impact on cash flow, 
legal and contractual obligations, or 
the reputation of the organization; re-
sources where maintenance costs are 
negligible point to low costs of modi-
fications
Mean value
Resources in which loss of confidential-
ity, integrity or availability could imply 
additional internal costs and a poten-
tial impact on cash flow, legal and con-
tractual obligations or the reputation 
of the organization; resources where 
maintenance costs are low and can be 
exchanged for higher mean costs
High value
Resources in which loss of confidenti-
ality, integrity or availability indicates 
the immediate impact on cash flow 
of the organization, the ability of a 
business, the reputation, or legal and 
contractual obligations; precious re-
sources
Very high value
Resources in which loss of confidenti-
ality, integrity or availability can cause 
a collapse of the organization, tremen-
dous damage, the current business 
deadlock or a serious loss of public 
reputation.
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Fig. 1. Information system risk management process
3. RESEaRCH aREa DESCRIpTION 
Research area is an ICT system within the company, 
with no prior risk management during the period of 
time in which security incidents of the ICT system were 
registered. The information (ICT) system consists of 
1,950 personal and laptop computers, 53 servers and 
3 server rooms. The number of employees amounts to 
1,700. Computer equipment is divided into personal 
computers, servers and virtual servers on VMware plat-
forms. Operating systems are Windows, AIX and Linux. 
Databases are Microsoft SQL, Informix, Oracle and db2. 
Outsourcing of the parts of the information system has 
been contracted with external companies in relation to 
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business activities of development and software main-
tenance, as well as computer equipment parts.
After the implementation of the risk management 
methodology, information system security incidents 
were recorded [7]. Registration after the implementa-
tion of the risk assessment methodology was conduct-
ed in the same manner, and the criteria for incident 
evaluation and classification have not been changed. 
Periods in which the comparison has been carried out 
are the same and they are divided into quarters of the 
year. Within each quarter, a total number of incidents 
was analyzed according to the criteria of the records. 
The contribution of this paper is based on measure-
ments of the number of incidents over time during 
which implementation of the risk management meth-
odology has been conducted.
4. COMpaRISON OF THE FREquENCy aND 
INTENSITy OF SECuRITy INCIDENTS
This section presents an incident occurrence analysis, 
as well as definitions of measures that describe the in-
tensity of the security incident. The research result lies 
in a significantly reduced number of security incidents 
(Fig. 2) in the field of information systems, in all aspects 
of frequency measuring, and the intensity of incidents.
The intensity is determined based on three compo-
nents. The first component is the duration of the inci-
dent in the information system, and it is presented in 
the form of system downtime duration (Fig. 3).
The overall strength or intensity is determined on the 
basis of classified templates of potential incidents. The 
third component is the priority of the incident deter-
mined by the person responsible for the management of 
incidents and/or the affected system (Fig. 4).
Information systems can be divided into two 
groups, i.e. key systems and supporting systems. 
Priorities can be assigned according to the systems 
belonging to one of the mentioned groups. Key sys-
tems are those with loss of some of the properties of 
confidentiality, integrity or availability, assessed as 
critical for the organization, having a possibility to 
cause unacceptable losses.
In the period after the implementation of informa-
tion system risk management, risks have been docu-
mented as follows:
•	 262 risks recorded (potential risks and informa-
tion system vulnerability);
•	 93 unacceptable risks;
•	 81 risks reduced to the acceptable level:
 - 59 by the implementation of security mea-
sures;
 - 10 by avoiding risks;
 - 8 by transferring to a third party;
 - 4 risks are accepted.
Fig. 2. Total number of incidents
Fig. 3. Downtime duration
Fig. 4. High priority incidents
The incidents were recorded in the same way in the 
whole period of time and there is no difference in the 
criteria according to which the incidents are graded. 
The total number of recorded incidents fell by 50% in 
the same period of time. The most interesting infor-
mation for business owners is the availability time of 
a business system. The percentage of availability is cal-
culated in the same period of time and it is displayed 
in hours. Figure 5 shows the difference in hours for a 
period of recording incidents before risk management 
(99.97048%) and after implementation of the method-
ology (99.98684%). The difference is 85.97 hours for the 
entire testing period (3.5 days).
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Fig. 5. Information system accessibility
Implementing the framework for information and 
communication technology risk management is in most 
cases carried out with the aim of reducing the number 
of adverse events and increasing the effectiveness and 
efficiency [13]. In addition to the benefits that risk man-
agement can bring to the personnel using information 
and communication technologies, it is useful to consider 
the economic impact [14], which is often the most in-
teresting information in the decision-making process. 
Information system risk management raises the level of 
awareness among staff, but also creates an environment 
that systematically solves the problems associated with 
weaknesses and threats. The results of this research di-
rectly point to the benefits gained after the implemen-
tation of systematic risk management. Indicators such 
as downtime duration and the availability time directly 
point to the desired benefits of management.
5. FuTuRE WORK aND RESEaRCH
The impact of risk management outsourcing is an 
area regulated by a separate methodology, having a 
distinct tool developed for this purpose [6]. It is neces-
sary to normalize measurement results of both risk as-
sessment methodologies in order to make them com-
parable with each other. One of the possible measures 
to minimize risk is to transfer risk to a third party. Risk 
management externalization is a process that can con-
solidate risks within the company as well as those that 
have been transferred to a third party [10]. The process 
of externalization is often associated with strictly de-
fined contracts and it is not possible to conduct super-
vision and risk management by third parties, but it can 
be expected that the implementation of the risk man-
agement externalization process can reduce security 
incidents that have occurred through externalization.
Risks recorded in the category “Personnel” are associat-
ed with the information system user habits, and during 
information system risk management such risks were 
reduced. By using ontology databases and algorithms 
capable of detecting risky user behavior, it is possible to 
reduce adverse effects of such events [5]. A combination 
of ontologies and calculation of the posterior probabil-
ity with some algorithms allows us to define priorities 
based on the probability of adverse events. By using 
algorithms to calculate the posterior probabilities of 
adverse events based on estimation of the probability 
of threat realization and vulnerability from risk analysis, 
certain scenarios simulations can be created [12]. Risk 
situation scenario simulations provide a detailed insight 
into the environment and all associated parameters im-
portant for the preservation of the information asset 
properties [11]. There is some ongoing research in the 
area of decision-making support combined with Bayes-
ian learning which is applied on an information system 
risk assessment. Questionnaires have been developed, 
providing an insight into user awareness of the informa-
tion security process [15], [16], [17].
6. CONCluSION
Information system risk management is a process that 
ensures a high level of awareness of personnel respon-
sible for information system management. The initial im-
plementation of risk assessment is a process that is more 
demanding administratively because it is necessary to 
implement the recording of assets and analyze the pro-
cesses involved in the evaluation. Every subsequent as-
sessment update complements the risk management 
process which highlights the vulnerabilities and threats, 
as well as the result of their influence, in addition to the 
recorded weaknesses. It is very important to define mea-
sures that objectively show the value of subjective analy-
sis and values that are difficult to measure. Therefore, in-
formation asset properties are introduced in the process 
of estimation in the form of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Loss of any of the properties objectively rep-
resents a certain measure of the intensity of the incident. 
Measures of vulnerability and threats are presented as 
a probability of realization of these events and they de-
pend on both the technical environment of information 
assets and the security measures implemented within 
that environment. Criteria for incident classification did 
not change during the time period the survey was con-
ducted in. Also, the key parts of the information system 
did not significantly change either, except for minor 
changes. Minor changes to the information system are 
considered to be an acceptable fluctuation of staff and 
equipment within regular maintenance. 
The largest advantage of the risk management 
methodology for company owners and management 
personnel is a significantly reduced information sys-
tem availability time (3.5 days). On the other hand, for 
professionals working in ICT, a reduction in critical in-
cidents and a significantly higher level of awareness in 
ICT systems is the largest advantage.
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